

Dr. Wheelon opposed Fulini's "cover story on surfacing OX -

22 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT: EXCAET Surfacing

1. The attached text for a White House release on the EXCAET is provided for your review and possible use in discussions with the President. It handles three possible circumstances under which surfacing might occur by changes of an introductory paragraph. However, the basic statement is attuned primarily to willful disclosure at the present time, and minor modifications would be required if used at a later date.

2. My basic recommendation to you is that we not surface the EXCAET. If events force us to do so, I believe that the attached text deals with the problem in the best possible way. The essence of this statement is that it is the truth. Most cover plays are designed to be creased with minimum incremental loss, by constructing a fabric of fictions. If we are going to surface at all, we intend to reveal the basic fact of its existence and the question is how much of the whole story we tell. Since we are taking the initiative, we should be better able to control the amount of disclosure by following a consistent though restrained policy.

3. Dr. Fulini has shown a strong desire to try to surface this vehicle by declaring publicly that the entire program has been transferred to the Air Force. I must advise you strongly against this course, since I am convinced that such a statement will only go toward making the immediate fiction become an early reality. Dr. McMillan is with us on the basic philosophy of telling only the truth so as not to feed the strong tendency to eventually transfer the EXCAET to Air Force control, and there was a pleasant unanimity among Brock, General Carter and myself on this whole

NRO review(s) completed.

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Subject: OXCART Surfacing 3

question last Saturday. However, in Rubini's final submission to us late last Monday, he included two options for surfacing: (a) argument Air Force acquisition, and (b) Air Force follow-on; indicating that he still feels that the former has merit.

d. At our meeting, we reached general agreement that there should be five basic paragraphs and agreed on what we would include in each:

- a. How it started.
- b. Present status and capability.
- c. Future plans for CIA utilization.
- d. Military follow-on.
- e. SSI fallout.

Unfortunately, Rubini's Monday draft for which we waited mixed the paragraphs badly and suggested new topics such as "Flybys at Edwards" and publicity for special individuals in the program; you will note General Carter's reactions in the margin. I believe that my present draft reflects the CIA position and would be quite acceptable to McMillan. I suspect that Rubini would continue to try to inject his thoughts in successive drafts and doubt that anything is to be gained by delaying your examination further.



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ALBERT D. WHEELON  
Deputy Director  
(Science and Technology)

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Distribution:

- |                    |                            |
|--------------------|----------------------------|
| 1. Addressee       | 6. GSA                     |
| 2. Gen. Carter     | 7. ADW Carono              |
| 3. Mr. Brem        | 8. DD/S&T Subj             |
| 4. Mr. Kirkpatrick | 9. DD/S&T Chrono           |
| 5. Dr. Wheelon     | DD/S&T:Wheelon: [Redacted] |

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Attached: Proposed Text  
(DCI cy) Rubini Draft

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OXCART - Surfacing by President

[redacted] 14 Nov 63

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Item at ~~DCI~~ staff meeting DCI morning meeting 14 Nov.

Gen. Carter indicated to the DCI that Leo Geary said considerable pressure being put on everyone in Pentagon to surface the OX. At this point, the DCI said he had talked with President ~~Johnson~~ Kennedy who said "I will make the decision." *(22 Nov. 63, 8 AM, Kenedy)*

The DCI said to Gen. Carter, quickly finish your paper on surfacing so we can have a meeting with Fubini and McMillan to get agreement on how surfacing would be effected if the decision is made. The DCI said he considered this his responsibility to advise the President.

OXC-6026-63

16 nov. 1963 is good A-12 background paper.

*Unilateral decisions by LBD - 14 Nov 63*

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